America’s movement in the post-Crimea Eurasian chessboard

Warming up “Pivot/Rebalance”

This is the third Asian trip of President Obama.  During his first visit to Australia in November 2011, President Obama announced the policy of “pivot/strategic rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific region. In the second trip in 2012, he attended the East Asia Summit (EAS) and backed Myanmar’s “pivot” toward the West. This trip in April is thought to be a make-up for the canceled visit in October last year - a result of the U.S government’s shutdown. However, the motive behind this trip is far more complicated, considering the implications of U.S policies on Asia since the fall of the Soviet Union. In his two consecutive terms, President Bill Clinton had “focused on economic as a laser beam” and achieved impressive records: the U.S economy retained growth for 113 months in a row, and the operating budget is balanced. At the same time, the Clinton administration expanded NATO eastward, pushed Russia to the 2^nd (or even 3^rd) class of major countries, led the NATO air raids in Kosovo (1999), transformed GATT into WTO to create a new venue for the world’s economy and deployed the “Engage and Expand” strategy as a method to counter the threat of a rising China.

After the 11/9 event, with the support of the Neo-Conservatism faction, the Bush administration adopted the “pre-emptive strike” doctrine and waged two wars in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). Nevertheless, the 2008 global economic crisis pushed America to the brink of recession. President Obama came to power with a gloomy legacy of politics, military, economy and society, both domestically and abroad.

In early 2008, as the West rushed to recognize Kosovo, Russia operated a blitzkrieg in Georgia, then recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent nations. This is the first Russian retribution on the NATO’s eastward movement and the American uni-polar world order. On 2009, China surpassed Germany to become the biggest exporter of the world. On 2010, President Obama announced his first National Security Strategy, confirming “our strength and influence abroad begin with the steps we take at home”[1]. Therefore, U.S foreign policy must not only aim outward, but also seek to solve domestic basic issues such as education, health insurance, infrastructure and social welfare system in order to maintain competitiveness and prosperity. Senator John Kerry stated to the US Congress on his appointment as the Secretary of State: “Foreign policy is economic policy”[2].

Nowadays, U.S policies on the Asia-Pacific region are facing various challenges as well as opportunities. Firstly, China took the place of Japan as 2^nd biggest economy of the world in late 2010; they simultaneously showed more assertive actions in the East Sea (South China Sea). Secondly, the Asia-Pacific region became the main drive of global economic recovery and growth. The “pivot/strategic rebalance” policy is not limited at the relocation of U.S military forces in Asia-Pacific, an effort to rebalance global strategic situation and shift the strategic focus to Asia. It is also related to politics, economy and trade issues, including the TPP and TTIP negotiations.

“Pivot/Rebalance” toward Asia does not mean neglecting the Middle East and Europe on the “Grand Chessboard” (a concept introduced by Zbigniew Brzezinski in 1994).  According to Brzezinski, to ensure its continuous and solid role of leadership in the chessboard, America must control the Eurasian continent, where two competent rivals reside: Russia and China.

Stirring the Eurasian pendulum

The 2008 financial crisis exposed the American “double disasters” of economy and diplomacy. President Obama had to ride against the decline of American power. Currently, most Americans between the age of 20 and 40 do not regard wars as a necessary tool; they believed that the U.S should not be bogged down by prolonged wars. The Obama administration faced a paradox in foreign policy: National power is limited as a result of the economic crisis, defense budget is reduced, and the majority of American wants the government to enhance domestic strength following the “building our nation” trend. Nonetheless, local crises around the world dragged America to every part of the world. Although President Obama once declared that the U.S is no longer the “police of the world”, there are no signs that they had withdrawn from the post-Cold War alliances and commitments. America is only rearranging global strategic priorities.

An obvious fact about the Ukraine crisis is that when a power vacuum appears (the Maidan uprising led to President Yanukovych’s collapse), a major country can redraw its territorial map. That is why less than 2 months after Crimea was merged into Russia; Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel visited Asia to guarantee U.S commitment with the Asian pivot policy. In Beijing, he vowed to protect allies such as Japan and the Philippines in island clashes.

The recent European pivot of Washington D.C is meant to serve two long-term economic agenda: Opening the EU market for American petroleum products and promoting the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiation process. Besides, America also wanted to enhance the trans-Atlantic alliance; the fact that UK parliament forbad its government from taking military actions in Syria last August clearly illustrated the distance between traditional allies.

The Ukraine crisis and Russia’s emergence made NATO consolidate its forces and increase military presence at the eastern borders. This situation also clears the geopolitical and economic vision of the role of EU in the 21^st century global trade game through TTIP. Andre Sapir - an economist of Bruegel, a think-tank in Brussels commented: “We are the ones creating the rules; that is the center of TTIP”. According to him, America and EU will assemble about 80% of global trade regulations in the 21^st century. Once criticized in both Atlantic coasts, the TTIP project became a good idea plus a necessary project due to the Crimea incident[3].

The 2^nd level of Western sanctions on Russia came into effect when the Russian economy (the 8^th biggest in the world) has integrated deeply into the European economic system. It is nearly impossible to make Russia collapse financially. Moreover, EU leaders do not want to disrupt the stability, peace and prosperity of Europe - all of which has existed since the end of World War II - with Russia as a crucial factor.

On its side, Russia needs to make appeasement to secure the capture of Crimea. Constant Russian pressure as the Ukrainian presidential vote approaches forced Ukraine and EU to consider Russian interest in the context of a referendum on federal regulations for Ukraine. In addition, according to George Friedman from Stratfor, the most likely retaliate measure Russia could produce is to create tensions in the Baltic, Caucasus and Moldova regions - where a large Russian-speaking community resides - and prevent the unification plan of Eastern Europe into a single organization. At the same time, Russia might interfere in regions that the U.S found sensitive and left the Ukrainian government to destroy itself as a result of internal conflict.

Once again, America switches its focus to Europe. On the other hand, Asia must not be ignored because China poses a major threat to the long-term interest of America in the Pacific area. Since the global war on terrorism started 10 years ago, China has gradually changed the strength comparison in the Asia-Pacific region in a way undesirable to the U.S. This made the U.S adjust its strategies by deploying “pivot/rebalance” to increase engagement in Asia before it is too late. The post-Crimea Asian policy of the current U.S government is set up on 3 main directions of the “Grand Chessboard”: Asia, Europe and Middle East/North Africa. The visit to Asia last April of President Obama reaffirmed America’s determination to pursue a policy established in late 2011.

Once America “pivoted” back to Europe, the Asian policy cannot use that name anymore. The term “strategic rebalance” should be more suitable.

Geo-strategic Consequences of the Eurasian Double Pivot

Capturing Crimea is the second post-Cold War retaliation of Russia. This marks the end of the uni-polar era in international politics since the Cold War ended. Sooner or later, the U.S-Russia relationship will recuperate. In Europe, NATO, EU and other multilateral mechanisms will be reinforced to counter and restrain Russia. Meanwhile in Asia, America’s old bilateral military alliances cannot match China’s power and influence, despite being upgraded occasionally.

The U.S-Russia standoff is beneficial to China: it can relieve the strategic pressure produced by the American pivot toward Asia. The improving relationship between China and Russia will consolidate the strategic position of China in Asia. With Russia providing a safe strategic zone behind its back, China can feel more confident in the U.S-China competition in the Asia-Pacific region.

Russia’s reemergence is in harmony with Beijing’s desire of a multipolar world order. Alternatively, it opened up a new chance for China to maximize its national interest: the China’s placement of the oil rig HD-981 in Vietnam’s EEZ is a clear example of China’s post-Crimea assertiveness in the East Sea (South China Sea). As the history of Chinese engagement in the East Sea since 1949 has shown, every time a power vacuum appears in Southeast Asia, China accelerates its expansion. This time China took advantages of two situations related to the American policy on Southeast Asia: Firstly, the U.S pivoted back to Europe, thus the attention for Southeast Asia is reduced; secondly, President Obama did not make any declaration about the territorial disputes in the East Sea, which is opposite to the East China Sea issue. The U.S-Japan Declaration on 25^th April stated: “The United States of America will provide all necessary equipment to ensure the commitment of the Japan-U.S Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, including Japanese-administered territories such as the Senkaku islands. The United States of America is against any unilateral action that damages the Japanese administration on the Senkaku islands”.

In 2002, after America initiated the global war on terrorism, the 16^th National Congress of the Communist Party of China confirmed that the next 20 years is a “major opportunity” for China’s development. Its 18^th national congress on November 2012 stated: “According to the general views of international and domestic situation, our country’s development is still in an important time, with a lot of space for growth”. After a 12-year zodiacal period, China had one more chance to prolong its strategic opportunity.

The movement of U.S-China-Russia triangle began to come out through two events: President Vladimir Putin authorized the Chinese purchase of the S-400 air defense system. According to a Hong Kong newspaper, China has craved for the state-of-the art S-400 system for a long time; with this new acquisition. China can control its airspace firmly as well as the aerial situation in Taiwan and Senkaku islands. Elsewhere, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the United States Daniel Russel made a surprise announcement that the U.S can adjust its military relocation in Northeast Asia if China takes serious steps in encouraging North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons development program.

It is too early to speak of a new world order or a Cold War expanded from the U.S-Russia standoff. However if the U.S-Russia-China triangle can be materialized, it will affect the 21^st century global politics significantly.

A new, limited Cold War could push Moscow closer to Beijing in Asia-Pacific matters. Even so, any action that can break the strategic balance of “five major powers” in Asia-Pacific will bring negative effects to the region’s peace and stability.

President Obama’s visit to 4 Asian countries affected the situation of this continent on two main aspects: dealing with China; comforting allies and partners.

Firstly, a major challenge for U.S policy makers is how to keep China not too close to Russia in the process of strategic rebalance in Asia. The newly-formed U.S-China-Russia triangle will become one of the most complicated, asymmetrical and inconsistent relationship, with unexpected consequences in the post-Crimea world.

Russian media predicted in the near future, Russian military technology would be sold to China and Chinese capital could find its way into Russian market. China-Russia trade definitely can compensate for the damage of U.S and EU sanctions on Russia.

To sum up, an important question stands out: How will the “new model of major country relations” that Chinese President Xi Jinping recommended to U.S President Barack Obama last June (which the Americans somewhat accepted) be materialized in the post-Crimea world? Can it blend with America’s East Asian alliance?

Secondly, in order to gain advantages in both Asia and Europe, the relations with traditional allies will be prioritized by the U.S. In another aspect, Asia’s immediate response to the new European crisis is finding a new intention for counter and balance; meanwhile bilateral and multilateral security solutions should be laid out - a security structure that can prevent a “Ukraine scenario” in Asia.

In that condition, can the U.S presence in East Asia alliance structure maintain its original value? How will the U.S respond to bilateral and multilateral security scenarios in Asia? Can America cope with the coercive diplomatic methods that China is deploying toward its traditional allies such as South Korea and Japan, or when Japan builds a balanced alliance in the new Eurasian context and presses on with the military modernization to the maximum level below possessing nuclear weapons?

From the post-Crimea world, Asian countries can realize that an American security guarantee is still necessary; several countries decided to enhance the alliance with the U.S - still an irreplaceable force in the regional power structure. To ensure the effectiveness of that guarantee, U.S allies in Asia want Washington to strengthen its commitment and increase engagement in the region. This is exactly what Japan, South Korea and Philippines have been doing.

Recently, America has adjusted a few policies. Instead of depending more on America, the Obama administration encouraged allied countries to improve direct defense relationship with each other. President Obama organized the first U.S-Japan-South Korea summit in The Hague, with the main purpose of coordinating policies between these two critical East Asian allies.

America and Japan agreed to establish a permanent mutual defense agency. This solution is expected to be included in the “Guideline for Japan-U.S Defense Cooperation”, which will be amended in this year to deal with possible Chinese scenarios in the Senkaku islands. Before that, on July 2006, Japan refused an American offer of creating a permanent mutual defense agency. This agency will also monitor the tensions on the Korean peninsula with Japanese assistance.

The rebalance in this region was materialized by the U.S-ASEAN Defense Forum, which was hosted by U.S Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel in Honolulu from 1-3 April 2014. The treaty signed during the President Obama’s visit to Philippines which allowed Washington to access more military bases is a significant point in his Asian trip. With that agreement, U.S presence in the South China Sea is increased, reinforcing the American strategic rebalance in Asia-Pacific. However, its impact on the power balance and stability in this region still need to be justified.

Dr. Nguyen Ngoc Truong, President of CSSD. Published in the Communist Review, May 2014 issue.