VTC1 interview

Dr. Nguyen Ngoc Truong, former Head of the Diplomatic History Research Board, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the co-author of the book "Foreign Affairs of Vietnam 1945-2000" (National Politics Publising House, Hanoi, 2002). In this book, Dr. Truong wrote 3 chapters, including "Foreign Affairs of Vietnam 1947-1954", in relation to summarizing the Geneva Conference on Indochina in 1954.

VTC1 interview

Commenting on the exchanges of domestic and international scholars when reminiscing the experience and lessons for foreign affairs of Vietnam on this conference, Dr. Truong stated that Vietnamese authors put the emphasis on “finding others’ faults but make light of realizing the faults ourselves”.

Concerning the voice that during the negotiation process, China delegation only paid attention to its benefits but neglect Vietnam’s ones, Dr. Truong assumed that the attribute of major powers’ diplomacy is to seek the compromise to maximize their benefits, and that the smaller countries’ benefits are often vulnerable. At that time, the diplomacy of Vietnam just came out of the mountain battle but jumped straight to the international arena. Although the diplomatic members were all judicious, they lacked information, strategic evaluation, and the arts of negotiating (the fact is that no one was formally trained on international politics, diplomacy at that time). Thus, it was unavoidable that Vietnam sustained some disadvantages. In many cases, Vietnam delegation fell into the "trap" of big countries, among which related to the interests of the parties in the Vietnam-Cambodia-Laos coalition…

Dr. Nguyen Ngoc Truong assumed that the significantly realistic lessons drawn from Geneve 1954 for Vietnam diplomacy as well as comtempory Vietnamese public are realizing and effectively participating into political games of major powers, in which they found ways to maximize their benefits. 

The smaller countries, which are situated at the buffering influential region of big countries, usually become victims of the conflicts between major powers. Therefore, we should judiciously exploit our geopolitical advantages, knowing how to strike a balance, taking advantage of conflicts, understanding give-and-take rule in order to avoid falling into deadlock strategy and ultimately maximize the national interests.

If needs be, Vietnam should know how to choose between the partial and long-term interests, from which acting in accordance with the trend and movement direction of evolutionary history. At the same time, when looking back the 60th anniversary of the Geneva Conference on Indochina in 1954, it can be summed up that: “Lost this one, gain that one”. Still, the bottom line is national strength as a diplomatic principle of President Ho Chi Minh, “strength is the gong, diplomacy is the tone, the bigger the gong is, the larger the tone is”.  Without these “partial” lessons from 1954 Geneve Convention, the successes from Paris negotiation from 1968 to 1973 and Great Victory in the spring of 1975 could not be achieved.